Summary of financial recommendations of CRCC 2023

On January 30, 2025, President John Mahama swore in an eight-member committee to review the country’s 1992 Constitution.

The President tasked the committee to engage key stakeholders to solicit their views on the proposals for constitutional review by the 2010 Constitution Review Commission (CRC) and the 2023 Constitution Review Consultative Committee (CRCC) and make actionable recommendations aimed at enhancing democratic governance in Ghana.

By this, President John Dramani Mahama has demonstrated a commitment to a non-partisan process, as he builds on the efforts of his predecessors towards constitutional review.

This is because the work of the 2010 Committee was under former President John Evans Atta Mills and that of the 2023 Committee was during the term of former President Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo Addo. 

We commend highly the true statesmanship demonstrated by his President John Mahama in considering all these view in his commitment to constitutional review.

As the draft report of the CRCC 2023 was shared with you previously, we consider it necessary to share a summary of the final recommendations in the CRCC 2023 Report to aid the public in the current deliberations.

The recommendations in the CRCC 2023 report cover two broad areas: (a) the proposed process for the amendment of the Constitution; and (b) thematic areas for amendment.

Summary, key recommendations

General Amendment Procedure: The Constitution provides within itself, its own procedures for changing any of its provisions if, for any reason, that provision no longer serves the people well.

The lawful means of changing any or all the provisions of the Constitution is by amendment.

The Constitution provides two ways by which it can be amended: Through an Act of Parliament, (for non-entrenched provisions); or referendum, (for entrenched provisions).

The attachment to the CRC Report of 2011 contained two draft bills for the amendment of the Constitution. One of the draft bills was for the amendment of non-entrenched provisions; and the other was for the proposed amendment of the entrenched provisions.

The draft bills with respect to the amendment of the non-entrenched provisions specified all the proposed amendments falling within non-entrenched articles, and that for the entrenched provisions did the same.

The amendment for entrenched provisions was therefore to be done in a single Bill, although this bill indicated the specific provisions requiring amendment.

These draft bills are included in this Report in Appendix 5. The Committee recommends the following amendment procedures;

• With respect to entrenched provisions, (as these require a referendum), proposed amendments must be done in separate individual bills in accordance with subject matter and consequential amendments, rather than in a single bill specifying all entrenched provisions proposed for amendment. Each proposed bill for amendment, (containing not more than one subject matter at a time), must be voted on separately.

However, more than one proposed amendment may be presented to the Referendum if it permits the people to vote for each of them separately.

• With respect to non-entrenched provisions, we agree with the CRC 2011 proposal, i.e. that it may be presented in a single Bill.

It is our considered view that the above procedure gives the people of Ghana, the opportunity to reflect on the effect of each amendment and decide whether they want that amendment.

Putting the amendments together in a single bill denies the people the right to decide which specific bills they want, and which specific bills they do not.

We are of the view that this is more consistent with democratic values than putting all amendments in a single bill, as it is entirely possible that some may want specific amendments, but not others.

While putting the amendments together in a single bill therefore denies the people a true choice in the matter, offering the people a chance to decide on each bill independently validates the people’s agency in the referendum.

We propose a similar approach for proposed amendments of non-entrenched provisions, (which do not require a referendum), (i.e., that amendments be pursuant to separate bills grouped in accordance with subject matter and consequential amendments).

However, as Parliament has deliberative powers over bills, an alternative approach for the amendment of non-entrenched provisions, would be to align with the original proposal of the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) and consolidate all changes into a single comprehensive option. 

 Proposals, thematic areas for amendment

a. Determination of the conditions of service of some public officers by the president, (i.e., Article 71 holders)

The Committee recommends that the emoluments of article 71 holders must be determined pursuant to a predetermined formula. This predetermined formula is to be set by an Independent Emoluments Committee, (IEC), composed of one representative each from the following institutions: the

• Public Services Commission, 
• Ministry responsible for Finance, 
• Organised Labour,  Audit Service, and 
• Fair Wages and Salaries Commission.

The mandate of this IEC shall be to prescribe an emolument formula for the emoluments of article 71 holders. The emoluments of article 71 holders shall thereafter be determined pursuant to this formula, without the need to set up any further committees in the future.

The institutions shall nominate their representatives, and the President shall appoint them.

The emoluments of this IEC shall be similar to sitting allowances applicable to public Boards and Committees, and the IEC is to be dissolved after setting the pre-determined formula.

The formula shall thereafter be managed by the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission.

This avoids the continuous setting up of committees to determine the emoluments of article 71 holders.

b. Parliament

The Committee recommends that the size of parliament be capped to two hundred and seventy-seven elected members. Article 93 of the Constitution should therefore be amended to read as follows:

“There shall be a Parliament of Ghana which shall consist of not more than two hundred and seventy-seven elected members.” The implication of this is that there must be consequential amendments to Article 47 to place a numerical cap on the number of constituencies that Ghana must have.

Article 47 must therefore be amended to read as follows — “Ghana shall be divided into as many constituencies for the purpose of election of Members of Parliament as the Electoral Commission may prescribe; however, the number of constituencies shall not exceed 277.

The reasons for the choice of 277 elected members as the maximum number are two: (a) recommending a lesser number than the existing number will require that certain constituencies be scrapped.

The decision on which constituencies to scrap would involve politicians and their followers, and it is not reasonably expected that a political party would approve that constituencies in its stronghold be scrapped.

On the other hand, it can be reasonably expected that each political party is more likely to lean towards recommending constituencies in its opponent’s stronghold to be scrapped. This would invariably result in needless acrimony.  

Not recommending a reduction would therefore be the less acrimonious option; (b) the existing constituencies are already two hundred and seventy-six. As an odd number is to be preferable, we recommend an upper limit of 277.

c. Appointment of ministers from Parliament

The Committee recommends that the President must have the option of appointing persons including members of parliament as ministers, provided that a Member of Parliament who is appointed as a minister shall vacate their seat.

This is to address the challenge of the situation where some persons may contest for parliamentary positions not because they are interested in the work of parliament, but rather because being a member of parliament is also a means to earn an appointment as a minister of state.

d. Cap on appointment of ministers and deputy ministers

The Committee recommends that there must be an upper limit on the number of Ministers and Deputy Ministers that a President can appoint, and this upper limit should be 55.

e. Appointments of heads of Independent Constitutional Bodies (ICBs) and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)

To address concerns raised by stakeholders on the influence of the executive in the appointment process of the heads of ICBs and SOEs, a revision of the current appointment procedure is recommended.

The Committee recommends that the heads of ICBs be appointed by an open competitive process which includes parliamentary vetting and approval, after which the successful candidates are appointed by the President.

The Committee recommends that this appointment procedure be extended to all heads of ICBs including the Electoral Commission (EC), National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) and the Government Statistician and all heads of SOEs.

The writer is (Chairperson, CRCC, 2023)